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A number of books and articles were published on the three consecutive Italian 
wars in Libya and its resistances during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century. However, the role and experiences of the Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris 
were rarely studied. Thus, this article is an attempt to disclose their role in the 
wars, why they were interested in being employed by the Italians and why Italy 
relied heavily on them instead of the Italian soldiers and the Libyan askaris. 
Historical sources, like the memoires of Italian military commanders and the 
askaris, travellers’ accounts mainly that of journalists, correspondence documents, 
and popular songs particularly that of Tigrigna were consulted to write this 
article. Moreover, publications produced by military historians on the Italian wars 
in Libya were also referred. While starvation and famines, poverty, unemployment 
and maladministration were the driving force from Eritrea and Ethiopia; salary, 
military uniform, guns and bullets, rations, protections and relative freedom were 
some of the attractions from the Italian side for the Ethiopians and Eritreans to be 
employed as askaris. In relation to these, political expediency or loss aversion, 
cost, fighting skill and courage, adaptability to Libyan topography and loyalty 
were some of the qualities of Ethiopians and Eritrean askaris that initiated the 
Italians to rely on. As a result, about 68 battalions fought in the wars. In the 
process, the askaris were identified by their Italian commanders as “warlike race” 
and best soldiers in contrast to the Italian soldiers and Libyan collaborators. 
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The term Libya is an Egyptian word that refers to the region of North Africa as to 
the thought of the Greeks and only to Cyrenaica as to that of the Romans. In fact, 
there are also sources that indicate it is a Greek name for the Berbers of North 
Africa inhabiting the area west of Egypt.  It was to mean light skinned people in 
contrast to the term Sudan or Ethiopia to mean the blacks (Raza, 2012: 1; 
Shillington, 2005: 63). It was begun to be used for the present territory of Libya by 
the Italians since November, 1911. Modern Libya is a country which was founded 
in 1951 by unifying three territories of Northern Africa; Tripolitania, Cyrenaica 
and Fezzan (Raza, 2012: 2). Throughout most of its history, Libya was subjected 
to foreign rule, probably because of its proximity to the continental Europe and the 
Middle East. It was also the destination of long distance trans-Saharan trade route 
from west Africa to north Africa, particularly up to the end of the 15
th
 and 
beginning of the 16
th
 centuries. Then, the trade route was diverted to the Atlantic 
because of the opening of the Atlantic trade route to the “new world”.  Therefore, 
Libya was affected continuously by foreign cultures at least since the time of 
“classical civilization” of the Mediterranean world in the late BCs and early ADs. 
The major actors in these continuous influence and cultural dominance were the 
Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, and the Ottomans as well as the 
European colonizers who arrived in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (Ahmida, 
2005: 4, 6-9; Naylor, 2009:15, 35, 57, 109, 141).  
To start with the relatively much known incident and long lasting influence in 
the cultural aspect, the region was conquered by the Arab army of Islamic jihad in 
642 AD. The introduction of Islam was followed by intense phases of Arabisation 
mainly because of the migration of two nomadic Arab tribes, Bani Sulaim and 
Bani Hilal from Egypt and Hejaz during 1050-1100 AD (Raza, 2012: 2; 
Shillington, 2005: 157). 
North Africa became part of the Ottoman Empire beginning from the 16
th
 
century. The territories that became the present-day Libya were occupied by the 
Ottomans in 1551 AD and were governed as part of the Ottoman Empire with 
much internal autonomy for the next three centuries until 1830. It was re-
conquered in 1830 by the Ottomans‟ authority in the fear of the European powers 
and restored to 1855 (Shillington, 2005: 273-276). Italy was one of the European 
countries aspiring for the occupation of Libya throughout the last decades of the 
19
th
 century. This was because it could not compete for the other African territories 
as it was the late comer to the scene. By then, Libya was considered as “leftover” 
that could not attract the other European colonizers (Gooch, 1989: xi-xii). 
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Italy, the aspirant of Libya as its colony, was the heartland of classical Roman 
civilization until its collapse in the 5
th
 century AD. However, it could not be strong 
enough to be a unified state up to the 1870s. Most of the other European countries 
emerged as “nation states” after the period of renaissance and series of different 
aspects of revolutions, particularly, the industrial revolutions. The industrial 
revolutions led the way for international trades to flourish although not on equal 
grounds. These international trades finally led to the need for overseas colonies, in 
fact, along with other important drivers. These drivers can be categorized together 
as economic i.e., industrial raw materials and markets for industrial outputs. Thus, 
the industrial states that emerged began to look for colonies in Africa and Asia. 
Then, most territories in these continents were subjected to colonial occupation 
(Rodny, 1973). By the end of the 19
th
 century, Britain and France became the 
leading colonial empires. Relatively speaking, Germany and Italy were the late 
comers to the race. Even, in comparison to Germany, Italy was an infant state. That 
was why it took Germany as best model in its efforts of nation or empire building, 
like establishing modern army. In fact, Italy became a unified state by the second 
half of the 19
th
 century as did Germany (Gooch, 1989: 202). 
 Then, the unification of Italy was followed by its strong interest for colonial 
territories to obtain natural resources and establish colonial settlements (Ahmida, 
2005: 41). Since it was the late comer and did not have strong say, Italy was forced 
to go for the “leftover” territories and even for that it needed the support and 
recognition of Britain, France and Germany (ibid: 22-24; Tesfaye Gebre‟ab, 2017: 
158). Some of these “leftovers” were Eritrea, Somalia and Libya. Since the focus 
of this study is Libya, let us see how Italy attempted to colonize that territory.  
Italy‟s occupation of Libya was a long plan, preceded by emigration of 
significant number of Italians to that territory. As to Raza, “Italy adopted a 
gradualist policy of slow economic penetration of Libya, beginning in the late 
1800s” (Raza, 2012: 7) even before its official unification. Italian businessmen 
were supported and encouraged to purchase different concessions and 
manufacturing interests in Libya. They were also urged to participate in 
international Libyan trades.  The Bank of Roma, Banco di Roma, was ordered by 
the government of Italy to penetrate into the economy of Libya in 1905. By 1910, 
the Bank had established more than twelve branches in different Libyan towns and 
cities. Such economic penetration was to encourage the emigration of Italians to 
Libya to be employed in those economic enterprises. The migration was followed 
by the opening of Italian schools and the flourishing of Italian newspapers. 
Because of this emigration, the total Italian population in Libya became about 
27,495 by the end of the first decades of the 20
th 





After a long process of penetration, Italy began preparing for the armed 
conquest of Libya by the 1890s. Previously, it assured its occupation of Eritrea still 
through a long process of pushing in from the Red Sea coast where it founded a 
base in 1869. Then, it took Italy or its companies about quarter of a century to 
establish Eritrea as its colony which was accomplished in 1890. Consequently, it 
was from this Eritrean territory and northern Ethiopia that Italy began to recruit the 
colonial soldiers commonly called askaris. The term askaris was derived from the 
Arabic word “askari” which means “soldier”. Currently, it is used with similar 
meaning in Asian languages like Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Tajik, even Swahili and 
the like. But in the European colonial history, it is understood as a local soldier 
serving in the armies of European colonial powers mainly in the northern and 
eastern Africa. It was used in this sense of local soldier in English and other 
European languages including the Italian (Scarselli, 2015). 
Eritrea particularly Asmara and Massawa began to attract migrants from 
northern Ethiopia who were looking for employment, to work as laborers after the 
Italian occupation of that territory. Significant numbers of migrants were also 
employed as askaris to serve in Libya (Tesfa Mikael, 2006 EC: 21-30).  
 
The Recruitment of Ethiopians and Eritreans as Askaris by Italy 
The recruitment of natives for the purpose of colonial occupation was not special 
to Italy. All European colonial powers employed askaris from their newly 
occupied colonies. The Italians did the same since their occupation of Massawa in 
the 1880s where they met those who could be employed as askaris (Scarselli, 
2015: 15). The first recruited men were part of the Egyptian army from Sudan and 
the Red Sea shores who were serving the Ottomans as irregular soldiers. These 
were local police forces identified as bashi-bazouk. They served in the Italian army 
until the battle of Adwa in 1896. The official askaris were established on 28 
September, 1888 after a strong suggestion of a military commander, General 
Antonio Baldissera. Italy recruited significant number of askaris for its attempt to 
occupy Ethiopia which was routed at the battle of Adwa in 1896. The process of 
recruiting the askaris was characterized by rise and fall on the number of their 
battalions. They were increased in number significantly when need arises to about 
eight battalions and dropped down to about four battalions in 1902 and 
dramatically increased after 1911 because of prolonged resistances of the Libyans 
against the occupation (ibid: 18-19). Even if, the battalions were identified as 
“Eritrean battalions”, actually they were from Eritrea and the whole of northern 
Ethiopia. Tesfa Mikael who was a member of the askaris in the second campaign 
to Libya, Cyrenaica tells that, “ትሪፖሉ ሲሄደና ሲመሇሱም የነበሩት ሰዎች ኤርትራዊያን ብቻ 
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አይዯለም ከሁለ የበሇጡ ጎጃሞች ሲሆኑ ይመሇሱ የነበሩት ሰዎች ከድፍን ኢትዮጵያ ናቸዉ፡፡” (Tesfa 
Mikael, 2006 EC: 22). Roughly to mean “Those who went to and back from 
Tripoli were not only Eritreans; most of them were Gojjames; the returnees were 
[men] from the whole of Ethiopia”. As it is mentioned frequently throughout this 
article, Gojjam is known for its worst nature of maladministration and excessive 
taxations during the period of Ras Hailu. The Ethiopians and Eritreans were 
employed not only for battle fields but also to serve as guards in Italian 
concentration camps and prisons as well as porters in Libya. Ali Abdullatif 
Ahmida expresses his experience in Libya as “The guards for the camps were 
Italian colonial soldiers from Eritrea ..... Eritrean Askaris were Italian subjects who 
were recruited to serve as a cheap military labor in Libya beginning with the 
conquest in 1911.” (Ahmida, 2005: 48). 
Why did the Ethiopians and Eritreans want to be employed as Askaris for 
Italy?  
Sources indicate that there were several factors that pushed the Ethiopians and 
Eritreans from their home to Asmara to be employed as askaris. One of the 
prevalent problems that pushed Ethiopians and Eritreans from their localities was 
hunger and famines. Migration to Asmara was one way out from the recurrent 
famines of the late 19
th
 and first half of the 20
th
 centuries. Then, they came across 
this employment opportunity, askari (Amanuel, 1998: 258-259). Tesfa Mikael 
describes his experience in Eritrea about this issue as “The government of Italy did 
not think for the poor, it appreciated the starvation of the people. Why? Because 
they would be governed in peace and went for the Arab war in Tripoli.” (Tesfa 
Mikael, 2006 EC: 47). 
The other related drive, even much more common in Eritrea and northern 
Ethiopia, because of historical and geographical reasons, was poverty and 
unemployment. Thus, those who had the objectives of escaping poverty, “በሬ ገዝቼ 
አርሳሇሁ፣ ሊም ገዝቼ አሌባሇሁ፣ ከድህነት ቀንበር እወጣሇሁ” (ibid: 21) “purchase oxen to plow, 
cows to milk [and] to be free from the yoke of poverty”, migrated to Asmara and 
were employed as askaris for the Italian war in Libya. Hence, a popular song in 
Eritrea as, 
 
“ሉቢያ ዉረድ ተሰገር እምኒ 
እንተ ሞትካ ዕዯካ ትሰኒ 







 “descend or go to Libya crossing the desert, 
 in case you die, you will be free from your debt; 
 if not you will be prized a medal.”  
 
 It is also known that “the Tigrians [migrants] in Eritrea were engaged in all 
sorts of jobs ranging from shoe shine to cactus fruit selling, to hand craft, to the 
service industry, and in some instances to clerical... positions.” (Ghelawdewos, 
2017: 3). Then, it was also from these Tigrians who went there for the mentioned 
occupations that the recruitment was carried out.  
Local maladministration, mainly in Northern Ethiopia was also one of the 
major driving forces. Sometimes, it has been over emphasized as the major cause 
for the migration and recruitment of the Ethiopians than the Eritreans. It was 
justified that the recruitment of the Eritreans was linked to colonial pressure but 
that of Ethiopians was the result of evil deeds of the regional or local governors. 
Tesfa Mikael, an Eritrean, depicted this fact in his discussion about a dialogue 
between an Eritrean Fitwurari by the Name Gila Giyorgis and Ras Hailu of 
Gojjam, 
 
እርስዎ ራስዎ ጎጃምን መሌካም አድርጌ እገዛሇሁ ይሊለ፤ ነገር ግን የጣሉያን መንግስት 
ወዳጅዎ ስሇሆነ ትሪፖሉ ሔዯዉ ስንቱ ጎጃሞች እንዯሞቱና ስንቱ አካሊታቸዉን 
እንዯተቆረጡ፣ ስንቱስ በጦርነቱ እንዯሚያገሇግለት ሇይቶ ዝርዝራቸዉን ቢጠይቁት 
በዯስታ ይሰጥዎታሌ፡፡ በከንቱ ትሪፖሉ እየሔዯ ያሇቀዉን የጎጃም ሕዝብ ቁጥር 
ሲያዉቁት በዯስታ አሇመኖሩንና ሇጠሊቱ መንግስት ሲያገሇግሌ በብዙ ሺህ የሚቆጠር 
ጎጃሜ መሞቱን ሉረደት ይችሊለ፡፡ (Tesfa Mikael, 2006 EC: 23) 
 
 Nearly to mean 
 
You say, I am governing Gojjam well, however, since the 
government of Italy is your friend, ask how many Gojjames are 
dying, losing their organs and still serving in the war in Tripoli. 
The government will give you their list. When you know the 
number of Gojjames who went to Tripoli and perished in vain, you 
can understand that they did not live in happiness, rather thousands 
of them were perished while serving the government of their 
enemy. 
 
The administration of Ras Hailu was known for its numerous types of 
taxations in the history of Ethiopia. It is said that he levied poll tax on each male 
member of the society regardless of their age. As to the same sources, Ras Hailu 
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was collecting taxes even from the needy (Tekeleyesus, 2002 EC: 209-211). So, it 
is not surprising that a number of male members of the Gojjames were leaving for 
Tripoli via Asmara. It was because of this fact that an Italian officer who registered 
them for recruitment said “ራስ ኃይለ መቼ ይመጣሌ?”; “When will Ras Hailu come?” 
referring that “all the Gojjames are coming” (Mersie Hazen, 1999 EC: 118). 
The cultural attitudes of Ethiopians and Eritreans that is , to be a man of 
battle, warlike culture mainly as to the memoirs of Italian military commanders 
which were gone through by Aldo Giuseppe Scarselli, was also another driving 
force for the enlisting of Ethiopians and Eritreans to be employed as askaris 
(Scarselli, 2015: 24-26). Similarly, Gebreyesus Hailu wrote in his book entitled 
Conscript (A novel of Libya‟s anti colonial war) that “why do you wish to fight for 
a foreigner? What use it for you and your people to arm yourselves and fight 
overseas? You have all you want, why? ”. The author gave the answer for such 
questions as “he [the conscript] resolved to go to Libya to fight as a hero and gain 
fame” (Gebreyesus, 2012: 7). In fact, the warlike attitude and love to firearms 
seem common in the culture of Ethiopians and Eritreans. The one who had oxen 
and cows sold them for a gun. Songs and other related indications are there. 
Therefore, the Italians provided them with rifles for free, a golden opportunity for 
the youngsters (Teshale, 1995: 35-37, 51). 
The other social factors that initiated youngsters to be enlisted in the 
recruitment were the news from the returnees of the first Italo-Libyan war 
(Tripoli), as one of the participants commented, “When my relatives who went to 
Tripoli in the fifth battalion, visited Rome and come back urged me....” (Tesfa 
Mikael, 2006 EC: 21). Thus, influenced by their story he was recruited in the 8
th
 
battalion of the Ethiopians and Eritrean askaris to Cyrenaica, Aderna in December 
1913.  
Such social attitude inspired even the small boys to think about a campaign to 
Libya although they could not be enlisted because of their age as their song 
indicate: 
 
“Come back to us later Tribuli 
Give us time to grow up” (Gebreyesus, 2012: 7). 
 
The sources from the Italian side gave due emphasis for the pulling factors 
like salary, guns, uniforms and rations. The memoirs of three military 
commanders, Giovanni Gamerra (officer of the old guards and took part in the 
early recruitment of the askaris), Errando Di Aichelburg (army trainer who met the 





askaris in Eritrea and Libya during the counter insurgency),written in Italian 
language were accessed by the present researcher through Aldo Giuseppe Scarselli 
who gives us detailed information about the experiences of the commanders with 
the askaris (Scarselli, 2015: 21-36, 37-40).  
There are evidences from the Ethiopian and Eritrean side that support the 
Italian descriptions. In the earlier history of Ethiopia, the ones that went to war 
front was not provided with rations (foods and drinks) by the government or his 
immediate masters. Rather, he had to prepare his provision from his own sources 
or loot from the peasants who were on the route to the battlefield or located in the 
enemy territory.  Probably, that is why the story of “ዉኃ ስንቁ” “water provisioned” 
regiment is popular in the military history of Ethiopia. But, recruitment to the 
Italian government as askaris solved all these uncertainties. The colonial soldiers 
were provided with all the foods although, the amount and types of food items 
provided to the colonial army and metropolitan army were different. As the Italians 
themselves mentioned the colonial army survived on less ration both in amount 
and quality (Arielli, 2015). Military uniform was also a new experience for the 
Ethiopian and Eritrean recruits. It inspired the youngsters who could not afford to 












Figure 1: The Ethiopian and Eritrean Askaris with their guns and uniforms 
Source: W.k. McCure, Italy in North Africa: An Account of the Tripoli Enterprise 
(London, 1913: 145).  
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Regarding ammunitions, guns and bullets were very expensive items that 
cannot be available easily in Ethiopia and Eritrea during the period under 
discussion. It was possible to access them without problem by being enlisted to the 
Italian army as askaris. The Italian military commanders discussed much about the 
askaris‟ love for ammunition, commitment to get it in the form of gift from their 
masters. As quoted in Scarselli“... their real passion is towards firearms: and they 
make every effort to have them. The officers, knowing how pressing this desire is, 
donated them as a prize in the circumstances of a reward. And when they have 
them, they become proud and superb, while the officers that provided the firearms 
became for them the greatest man on earth.”(Gebreyesus, 2012: 3; Scarselli, 2015: 
35). As to the memoirs of these Italian military commanders, the askaris did not 
want to carry much items when they went to battlefields, they needed to be free. 
But, this was not true to armaments. They were ready to carry as much as they 
were provided with. It developed their confidence to win battles (Scarselli, 2015: 
34). 
The salary paid by the government of Italy was also another attracting factor 
for the Ethiopians and Eritreans to be employed as askaris. The monthly salary of 
the askaris was by far better than that of the Ethiopian traditional soldiers‟ 
benefits. The traditional Ethiopian soldier got four thalers, a gabi (toga) and surri 
(a pair of trousers) annually. But, the askaris were paid 50 lire per month, about a 
total of 600 lire per year (Amanuel, 1998: 255). 
The appreciation and trust the askaris got from the Italians were also inspiring 
the others to be enlisted. They were recognized and appreciated for their military 
talent and shooting skill (Scarselli, 2015: 33). For instance, they were welcomed 
by the Italian emperor Victor Emmanuel, military generals and soldiers in Rome 
on their way back to Asmara from Libya (Tesfa Mikael, 2006 EC: 28). The 
military commanders mentioned above, added that the army members were at a 
better social hierarchy than the civilians in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Because of this, 
when the war in Libya required the Eritrean battalions and made a call for 
voluntary recruitment, it was gladly accepted.  Scarselli quoted from the memoirs:  
 
….at first it was a continuous rush of men that wanted to enlist 
both to serve under our flag and to fight and those who were 
recruited for this purpose were considered lucky. Those who left 
showed an immense joy, not thinking about the sorrow they were 
causing to their families, wives and mothers with their departure. 
Those who remained were full of envy and jealousy for the glory 





The other pulling factor, particularly for those who were subordinate to 
someone or slaves, was attainment of relative freedom when they were employed 
as free men, salaried Italian employee. It was also possible to get protection and 
safety for the helpless member of the society by joining the Italian army as askaris 
(ibid: 23-24). 
Moreover, the social history of northern Ethiopia was characterized by a 
number of conflicts and blood feuds. The enmity even among relatives was very 
critical in the areas where rist
2
 land tenure system was practiced. This frequent 
uncertainty forced some of them to be in the hands of powerful master or to look 
for opportunities that enabled them to own guns. One of the available opportunities 
during this time was employment as askaris of the Italian (Teshale, 1995: 71-101).  
 
Why did the Italians rely on Ethiopian and Eritrean Askaris for their wars in 
Libya?    
Organizing or employing askaris to conquer others‟ territories were common 
practices in the history of colonialism. The same was true in the colonial history of 
Italy in Africa. Both the recruiter and recruited had their own respective motives in 
this case. That of the employees has been described above. The following are some 
of the factors that led the Italian government to rely mainly on the askaris. 
One of these was “political expediency”. In comparison to employing Italian 
soldiers, employing colonial soldiers was more beneficial politically because of its 
possibility of “loss aversion”. The death of colonial soldiers barely had significant 
political crisis in comparison to that of Italian soldiers. The deployment of Italian 
soldiers to fight prolonged and steady wars in Africa was not politically effective 
and economically efficient. That was why the Italians inclined to deploy colonial 
soldiers, Ethiopians and Eritreans in this case, to their war fronts in Libya. It saved 
the government from possible “political backlash” that could happen because of 
the death of numerous Italian soldiers in the war fronts (Arielli, 2015: 53). 
Cost was another very important reason for the Italian government to rely on 
the Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris instead of Italian soldiers. The former were 
cheaper to maintain than the latter. Sources indicate that the colonial soldiers were 
recruited on a voluntary basis and considered as “mercenaries”. They were 
                                                          
2
 It meant the land inherited from ancestors or the land transferred from father to sons or 
daughters. It was both an ancestral descent claim and effective possession of the land. See 
(Teshale, 1995: 73) for further explanations.  
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employed for a two year term, but they were provided with an option to extend 
their term for another two years. In contrast to the askaris, an Italian soldier was 
entitled to a basic daily pay of 2.25 Lire, supplemented by a further 3.50 lire per 
day for services outside his homeland. But an askari was entitled to a basic daily 
pay of 1.50 lire for the same service during his first two years term and increased 
to 1.75 and 2.00 during the second and the third term respectively. And the one 
who was posted outside his country received a further allowance of 1 lira per day 
(ibid: 53). Therefore, an Ethiopian or Eritrean askari cost the government less than 
half of an Italian soldier. Moreover, the askaris was allocated fewer rations and 
could survive effectively on that (ibid: 54).   
Sources indicated that physical and mental attributes of Ethiopian and 
Eritrean askaris were also another advantage to rely on for Italy. Contrary to the 
“master race” theory of the British, the early 20
th
 century Italian officers and 
military scholars asserted that the Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris were better than 
that of the Italian soldiers in their level of effectiveness and masculinity. They 
wrote that the askaris were more suitable to the weather and could overcome the 
challenges of African topography (ibid).  
The other issue that can be taken as part of mental and physical attributes of 
the Ethiopian and Eritrean Askaris was their loyalty and “their love for waging war 
and fighting”. The Italian officers stressed strongly the “war like attitude of the 
askaris”. This attitude was common to a certain extent throughout the whole of 
Ethiopia. Warrior hood contributed for promotion, material benefits as well as 
social respect that were achieved from battlefields, ability to fight and win 
(Kebede, 1999:167-170). Therefore, Italians used this psychology for their 
recruitment of Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris. The Italian commanders concluded 































Fig. 2: The Ethiopian and Eritrean Askaris on the March   
Source: W.k. McCure, Italy in North Africa: An Account of the Tripoli Enterprise 
(London 1913: 145).   
This idea of “warlike attitude” was also mentioned by Gebreyesus Hailu in his 
novel entitled “the conscript” that the Habasha felt idle in the absence of war and 
always pray for war, as “Lord, don‟t let us be dormant, please bring us war.” 
(Gebreyesus, 2012: 7).   
Concerning the loyalty of the askaris, Knud Holmboe, a European traveler in 
Libya, gives a detailed description on why the Italians preferred the Ethiopians and 
Eritreans than the Libyans. He wrote what he observed in Cyrenaica as: 
 
“Here [in Cyrenaica] there was no a single Arab soldier; they were 
all natives from the Italian colony of Eritrea. „Why don‟t you use 
Arab troops?‟ I asked colonel de Ronco during the evening. „You 
can‟t trust them. They fraternize with the enemy.‟ „But are the 
Eritreans any better?‟ „They are more reliable. ..... The Arabs here 
in Cyrenaica are exceedingly poor soldiers, while we can trust our 
brave troops from Eritrea implicitly.‟...” (Holmboe, 2006: 62-63). 
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Moreover, the same traveler asked Lieutenant-Colonel Piatti, stationed at 
Maraua, “why there were so many troops from Eritrea in Cyrenaica?” the latter 
replied that the Ethiopians and Eritreans were the only troops that they can depend 
on. This was because “the Arabs are lazy and unreliable.  ....Run away at the 
slightest provocation..... The Eritreans are absolutely loyal to us.”(ibid: 83). 
The Role of Ethiopian and Eritrean Askaris in Libyan Wars 
The First Phase (1911-1912/13) 
The bulk of materials produced by both foreigners and Ethiopian and Eritreans 
scarcely mentioned the role of the Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris in the first phase 
of the war (Turko-Italian War). These materials consist of very fragmented 
information about the role of the askaris even in the other two phases of the Italian 
wars in Libya.  
Italy began to recruit the Ethiopians and Eritreans in Asmara after observing 
their actual “warlike” attitude and fighting behavior. While discussing the 
activities of Italian army in different fronts of the Turko-Italian war, an author 
discussed the condition of Red Sea and vicinity of Suez Canal as “the Italian 
garrison in Erythrea was reinforced from the 3700 Italian regulars to 10,000 men 
by recruiting natives.” (Beehler, 1913: 25). Mersie Hazen, who had interviewed 
one of the veterans in this war, wrote a description about the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean experiences in brief. As to his description, the occupation of Libya by the 
Italians was strongly resisted by the Libyan Arabs who collaborated with the 
Turks. This Libyan reaction forced the Italians to recruit askaris in Asmara, from 
the Eritreans, and migrants from Tigray and Amhara region. The news of Italian 
recruitment of Ethiopians and Eritreans disseminated throughout Eritrea and 
Northern part of Ethiopia very soon. Then, a number of individuals were migrating 
from Tigray, Gojjam, Wollo and even Shewa to Asmara to be employed as askaris 
(Merse Hazen, 1999 EC: 118; Tesfaye Gebre‟ab, 2017: 172). The informant of 
Merse Hazen told his story as follows:  
 
በ1903 ዓ.ም. ኢጣሉያኖችና ቱርኮች ሉቢያ ሊይ ሲዋጉ ተዋግቻሇሁ፡፡ ብዙ 
አማሮችም እንዯ እኔ ተቀጥረዉ መጥተዉ ይዋጉ ነበር፡፡ በዉጊያዉ ሊይ ብዙ ጊዜ 
የቆየነዉ ሰዎች በ1905 ዓ.ም. ሇዕረፍት ወዯ አስመራ ተመሇስን፡፡ በዚያን ጊዜ 
በአስመራ የነበሩት የኢትዮጵያ ቆንስሌ ሌጅ ወሰኔ ዛማኔሌ ይባሊለ፡፡ እኛን 
አማሮቹን ኑ ወዯ አገራችሁ ግቡ ሌጅ ኢያሱ ዯመወዝ እየሰጡ በወታዯርነት 
ያኖሯችኋሌ እያለ አባበለን፡፡ ከእኛ ከአማሮቹ ዉስጥ ምክራቸዉን ስሇተቀበሌነዉ 
ከአስመራ ወጥተን ወዯ ዯሴ አሇፍን፡፡ ….. አሇቃችን አቃ ገብሩ ናቸዉ፡፡ እሳቸዉን 
መሪ አድረገን ከአስመራ የወጣነዉ አራት መቶ ዓሥራ ሁሇት ሰዎች ነን፡፡ (Merse 






which can be translated as: 
 
I fought in the Turko-Italian War in Libya in 1911. A number 
of Amharas were employed and fought. Those, who were in the 
war for long time returned to Asmara in 1913. During that 
time, the consul of Ethiopia in Asmara was Lij Wosenie 
Zamanuel. He called us, the Amharas, and said come to your 
country, Lij Iyasu will employ you. Of the Amhara those who 
accepted his advice left Asmara and came to Dessie. Our 
commander was Aqa Gebru. Those we left Asmara under his 
command were four hundred and twelve men. 
 
One can deduce two points pertaining to the number of askaris from the 
quotation above. The 412 whose number is mentioned here are the ones who 
served for two years and relived from the fighting. They were only the Ethiopians. 
Of the Ethiopians, they were only the Amharas. The number does not include the 
Tigrians. Of the Amharas, the 412 are only those who accepted the invitation of the 
consul and were ready to be employed as Iyasu‟s police force, Trinbulee
3
. Thus, 
we can assume that only from one batch of Ethiopians who volunteerd to come to 
the palace of Lij Iyasu of which only the Amhara, were about 412. So, it can be 
estimated that the total number of one batch (battalion) might be near a thousand. 
Of course, Aldo Giuseppe Scarselli mentioned that “... on the first February of 
1912 the recreated 5
th
 Eritrean battalion left Massawa for Tripoli...The 5
th
 battalion 
with one thousand one hundred men was not only the first to be deployed in Libya; 
it was also the first indigenous battalion to reach Italy.” (Scarselli, 2015: 20). 
Regarding the appearance and psychological readiness of this battalion, an 
observer who saw them on their arrival in Tripoli depicted that: 
The askaris are very alert and soldierly-looking men, tall and 
spare with a splendid carriage, some straight- featured and 
copper- coloured, others of the black Sudanese type. They 
brought a good reputation from Eritrea, and they were to show 
themselves useful scouts and staunch fighters. Their mobility is 
                                                          
3
 It was the name of police force established during the reign of Lij Iyasu recruited from the 
returnees who fought in the Libyan war. Their name is a distorted form of Tripoli, Libyan 
capital.  
 
EJOSSAH Vol. XIII, No.2                                                      December 2017 
41 
 
remarkable, running bare-footed in the sand, they are able to 
operate with cavalry, and their endurance is not less noteworthy 
than their speed (McCure, 1913: 144). 
The confrontation made between the Ethiopian and Eritrean battalion, and the 
enemy on March 3 and 4, 1913 created a strong impression and confidence among 
the Italian military officials. It was explained from the Italian side as the askaris 
could defeat in their first battle with the Libyans who had a strong force near Bir -
el -Turki. They also forced the Arabs to retreat to the desert in their next battle 
described as “the Arabs melted into the desert”. The Italian officers were “proud of 
them” and they were “congratulated” by the government of Italy because of such 
successive victories (ibid). 
On the other hand, the Libyan source described it as “A battalion of askaris 
and a camel riding detachment arrived from Erythrea late in February, and was 
vigorously attacked by Arabs on March 4 at Bir-el-Turki, the askaris were routed, 
and only managed to escape into Tripoli under cover of darkness with heavy 
losses.”(Beehler, 1913: 163).   
Even if it is not clear from these sources who were victorious, it can be 
understood that the Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris fought in Libya in those battles. 
This first phase of the wars was fought for a year without significant victory from 
both sides, except the Italian aggressive atrocities on the Libyans in many cases. 
Then, both of them were ready to a peace treaty because of their respective 
reasons. On the Italian side, they were fed up of fighting that prolonged war which 
even took the character of a jihad war. It was extremely costly for the Italians both 
in manpower and finance. Meanwhile, Turkey was also occupied with many 
resistance wars in most of its colonial territories. Especially, the challenge it faced 
in the Balkans at that time forced the Ottomans to arrange the condition of their 
last strong holds in North Africa, Libya (Tesfa Mikael, 2012: 22). 
Thus, the overall situations resulted in the withdrawal of the Turkish force 
from Libya. Unfortunately, it could not bring either peace to Libya or total control 
of the country by Italy. Rather, it resulted in the opening of the guerilla resistances 
of the Libyans against Italy under the Sanusi order. This resistance movement 
began in 1913 and continued for the next decade all through the course of the First 
World War (ibid: 23-28).  
 
The Second Phase (1913-1922) 
As it has been mentioned above, the withdrawal of Turkey from Libya could not 





they were left in the hands of the “infidels”. Thus, they opened a strong war of 
resistance against the Italians‟ and launched large scale attack to expand their 
control of Libya. However, the Italian soldiers were fed up of this prolonged war in 
Libya. They were not courageous enough to fight against the courageous jihadist 
Libyans. As a result of this and other cost related reasons, the Italians began to 
recruit askaris again, the 8
th
 battalion, because of the experiences they got from the 
previous battalions, particularly, from the strengths and efficiency of the 5
th
 
battalion who fought in the Turko-Italian War in Libya (Tesfa Mikael, 2006 EC: 
21).   
Historical sources indicate that a number of Ethiopians and Eritreans were 
recruited in the 8
th
 battalion from the migrants in Asmara. Those askaris in this 
battalion were exceeding in their fighting skill and courage. While, the Italian 
soldiers were terrorized by the acts of Libyan Arabs who beheaded the captives, 
the Ethiopians and Eritreans were bold enough to confront the Libyan Arabs and 
able to defeat or die without fear (ibid: 25). Italy continued to recruit the Ethiopian 
and Eritrean askaris, and formed the 10
th
 battalion. Up on the withdrawal of the 8
th
 
battalion from war fronts after 9 months, the Italians deployed the already recruited 
10
th
 battalion (ibid: 26). 
 Italy fought for about three to four years continuously to crush the resistances 
of the Sanusi of Libya. However, to its detriment, it began having financial 
problems. Then, Italy plan to make truce with the Sanusi leaders of Libyan Arabs. 
Accordingly, beginning from 1916 to 1920, about three different accords were 
signed. These were identified as treaties of al-Zawaytina (1916), al-Akramah 
(1917) and al-Rajma (1920) (Raza, 2012: 29-31). Unfortunately, these accords 
between the two were tactical and to buy time, rather than for ultimate peace. 
Thus, relations between the two deteriorated and led to the third phase of Italo-
Libyan War; mainly after 1922 (ibid: 31-32).    
 
The Third Phase (1922-1932) 
Like in the first and second phases of the Italo-Libyan wars, the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean askaris played a significant role, in the third phase of the wars, even more 
in this case. The work of Arielli is informative in this aspect although it deals with 
all the four categories of askaris together; Libyans, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Somalis 
and Yemenites. In fact, the East African askaris were frequently identified as 
“Eritreans” altogether in the sources simply because of the Italians familiarity with 
their colony of Eritrea (Arielli, 2015: 54). Still, the number of Yemenites and 
Somalis were insignificant. The Italian military commanders had no confidence in 
Libyan Arabs as mentioned above.  Subsequently, most of the askaris were 
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Ethiopians and Eritreans, identified as Eritrean battalions or mixed battalions. Any 
ways, one can understand to what extent Italy relied on the askaris for its colonial 
wars in Libya from the following table adopted by Arielli from the archive of 














1914-15 19,000                                    50,500 1921-22 23,100 4,500 
1915-16                    14,000 61,000 1922-23 31,600 1,900 
1916-17   18,000    48,000 December 
1924 
23,792 11,223 
1917-18 18,000 48,000 December 
1925 
23,990   13,163 
1918-19                  18,500 57,000 December 
1926 
22,723 14,130 
1919-20                   21,500   25,000 September 
1927 
25,820                            17,448
1920-21                   21,300                                    5,700 November 
1928              
28,558                      12,672
Table 1: Troops Stationed in Libya, 1914-1928 
Source: Nir Arielli, “Colonial Soldiers in Italian Counter-Insurgency Operations in 
Libya, 1922-32” in British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 2, 
February 2015, University of Leeds. Available at www.bjmh.org.uk 
 
It is possible to infer the proportion of Ethiopians and Eritreans from this 
table; even if, it is difficult to indicate their exact number. This is because Italy did 
not have vast colony during the WWI unlike other Europeans who could recruit 
askaris from their vast and different colonies. Similarly, it is also possible to 
understand the rise in the number of the askaris first gradually and then 
dramatically in different years. In this aspect, there were several landmarks. For 





because Italy was over stretched by the European war and signed accords with the 
Libyans to make truces (Raza, 2012: 29). Of course, by 1916 Italy sent Ethiopian 
and Eritrean army to Libya so that it relieved its white troops from its war in 
Libya. That was because the Italian soldiers had a responsibility to fight in WWI, 
particularly in north Italy (Arielli, 2015: 52). And probably that was why the 
number of colonial armies increased by 4000. The other landmark was the end of 
WWI. By the end of the war, Italy could not send a large number of metropolitan 
armies to Libya because of the arrangements in the Paris Peace Conference and the 
heavy losses of Italy during the war. So, the number of metropolitan armies in 
Libya dropped from 57, 000 to 25,000 and to 5000 after a year whereas that of the 
askaris increased from about 18, 500 to 21, 500 (by about 3000). Generally, the 
end of WWI was followed by a sudden drop in the number of metropolitan armies 
from about 57,000 in 1919 to 1,900 in 1922. On the other hand, the number of 
colonial soldiers which was about 18,500 in 1919 rose to about 31,600 by 1922. 
The increase was because of the fact that the operation of re-conquest of Italy in 
Libya in 1922 was heavily relying on colonial troops; i.e, Eritrean battalions, and 
Libyan collaborators (ibid: 53).  
During this phase of the wars, the Eritrean battalions played a very important 
role in crushing the Libyan resistances. As mentioned in Arielli, they were praised 
as marchers, especially in mountainous terrain. The commanders reported that with 
them it was possible to cover 50 kms in a day. Their arrival in a battlefield, even a 
small one, could often decide the fate of that battle. They were identified as 
“excellent warriors”. The Italian military commanders were convinced that 
Eritreans were the key to crush the revolt in Cyrenaica in the summer of 1930 
(ibid: 55).  
Generally, Italy had employed a significant number of the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean askaris from the late months of 1912 to 1934. Sources indicate that about 
68 battalions and six artillery batteries were serving in rotation in Libya throughout 
the course of the wars. This was even to the extent of resulting in the scarcity of 
labour force in Eritrea by which an Italian official commented that “Eritrea must 
not be reduced in to a „seedbed‟ of askaris for the other colonies” (ibid: 56). As a 
result, the Italian colonial governors in Eritrea issued restrictive measures in its 
enrolment regulations to discourage the Eritrean recruitment that resulted in 
scarcity of labour force in Eritrea. Then, this opened the way for Ethiopians to be 
recruited replacing the Eritreans. Thus, there was mass enrolment of people from 
Tigray, Amhara, Gojjam, Shewa and the Oromo region. Surprisingly, there 
happened to be a settlement of people from Gojjam, Shewa and the region of the 
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Oromo in such Eritrean colonial towns as Ghinda, Nefasit and Keren from those 
who moved into Eritrea to get enlisted as askaris (Amanuel, 1998: 258).  
Of course, the armies that were sent from Eritrea also began to be renamed as 
“mixed battalions” because the large proportions of them were recruited from areas 
outside Eritrea proper. The vast majority of them were from northern Ethiopia, 
where Italian sources indicated it as “Amhara” and from Tigray as mentioned 
above. For instance, from the battalions consisting of 4,301 men sent to Libya in 
1924-25; 3,540 were recruited from the spaces outside Eritrean border, most likely 
from northern Ethiopia (Arielli, 2015: 57; Scarselli, 2015: 20). Because of this, the 
Italian colonial officials commented that 
  
The Ethiopian regent, Ras Tafari (soon to become Emperor Haile 
Selassie) is willing to turn a blind eye to Italian recruitment for the 
time being. However, at the same time he centralized the power of 
the state and created a national army. Hence the ability to recruit 
in Ethiopia could dry up completely if tensions between Italy and 
Ethiopia are to rise
.
 (Arielli, 2015: 57). 
 
The Italian colonial officials went to the extent of imploring Mussolini so that 
he avoided any action that disappointed Ras Teferi until the occupation of Libya 
should be accomplished properly. This was because there would be a possibility 
for Teferi to cut the flow of Ethiopian recruits (ibid).  
 
The Consequences of the Libyan wars  
The Italian colonial policy was an extremely brutal in the history of colonialism. 
Its practices both in Libya and East Africa could not attract the hearts and minds of 
the colonized people. That was partly why Italy could not pacify both Libya and 
Ethiopia for long during the occupations. The Libyan Arabs were fighting for 
decades against the Italians. Similarly, Ethiopians were also fighting against them 
throughout the five years of their occupation. A great proportion of the society 
developed strong antipathy against everything Italian and their collaborators both 
in Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia (Amanuel, 1998: 259). This hostility of Libyans 
against Ethiopia and Eritrea during their presence in East Africa as Italian 
collaborators was really strong. They identified the Ethiopian and Eritrean askaris 
boldly as “slaves purchased with money to subjugate our country to Italy.” (Tesfa 
Mikel, 2006 EC: 25).  
Even some members of the Eritrean askaris who returned from Libya felt that 





expressed their feeling as, “the Arabs fight for this barren land.” However, the 
Eritreans could not fight properly to defend their “beautiful land”. They condemned 
themselves saying that “A curse be upon us... we let our country be taken, and we 
were instruments to occupy someone else‟s land” (Gebreyesus, 2012: 41-42). It 
was also commented that by becoming instruments to occupy someone else‟s 
country the Ethiopians and Eritreans were committing serious crime that could 
backfire against them (ibid: 29).   
In fact, it really backfired against the Ethiopians after a decade or so when the 
Italians invaded the country. The Italians placed the Libyan children, between the 
age of 6 and 15, who were orphaned during the wars in Libya, in special camps to 





of the new force by 1934 when their maximum age limit was 18. This Libyan 
division is well remembered in Ethiopia because of taking no prisoners of war 
captives; they executed all the Ethiopian captives as vengeance for the Ethiopians 
and Eritreans who fought in Libya and resulted in the death of their parents 
(Arielli, 2015: 65-66).  
 
 
Figure 3: Orphans of Libyans killed in the war  
Source: Knud Holmboe, Desert encounters: An Adventurous Journey throughout 
North Africa (Planet earth, 2006: 70).  
The wars also resulted in apparent religious hostility between the Habesha 
and Libyans which was vividly prevailed during the Italian wars both in Libya and 
East Africa. The Danish traveler that is mentioned above carefully observed and 
recorded the prevailing religious enmity in the Italian concentration camps and 
prisons in Libya. He reported about his communication with a Libyan prison guard 
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in Derna.  The guard expressed his feeling to him as “Don‟t you think it is better to 
have Moslems to look after the prisoners than Eritreans? When no Italian officers 
are about, we can see that the prisoners have an easier time” (Holmboe, 2006: 
120). But, the Italians prefer to employ the Eritrean guards. This measure was 
understood by the Libyan prisoners as an extra punishment. The traveler claimed 
that they told him, “Do you know why the Italians are using Eritrean troops, 
because the Eritreans are Christians”. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the 
Libyans believed that they were fighting a religious war in Cyrenaica and every 
Christian was their enemy (ibid). 
Of all, the major consequence of the Libyan wars was loss of material and 
human resources. The Ethiopians and Eritreans who participated in the wars as 
askaris were victims of such destructions. This Tigrigna song which was translated 
into English by Amanuel Sahle indicates the real situation that was prevailing in 
Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea during the wars or after. 
  
“The train has come covered with smoke 
we are crying in vain for our missing sons 
for the train brings to Asmara only the lucky ones 
who had escaped deaths in the Libyan war.”(Amanuel, 1998: 258). 
 
The train here was the one that transported the askaris to Libya, bringing back 
those who escaped death in the war fronts and the news about those who died in 
Libya. Here is similar song that expresses popular laments for those who died in 
Libya.  
 
“One by one our boys are sent to their early graves” (ibid). 
 
As a result, the people requested the clergy to react against the enthusiasm of 
their youth for the recruitments as:  
 
“Our priests! why don‟t you speak out? 
Not even one young man can be found, 
All have gone to Tripoli” (Gebreyesus, 2012: 26). 
 
Even the askaris themselves were said to express their possible fate in Libya 
in their songs as:  
 





I have left my fertile land 
Left my home behind 
Left the evergreen trees 
The sparkling streams 
Of the world of my youth 
Though fragrant breezes from the valley 
Embrace my heart and soul 
Yet will I march to the unknown land. 
To die and rot on those scorching sands [of Libya]” (ibid: 13; 
Amanuel, 1998: 259). 
 
The oversea travel of the askaris from the Red Sea to Libya was full of 
challenges and accidents. A number of them faced destructive ship wreck. One of 
such accidents happened to a ship Regina Elena that was transporting about 500 
askaris of the 7
th
 battalion in the Mediterranean Sea probably in 1923. Of the 500 
askaris only few of them survived from the accident (Tesfaye Gebre‟ab, 2017: 
173). Moreover, the askaris who took part in those wars in Libya faced another 
related problem on their way back home. For instance, at one instance about 60 
askaris fall sick and taken to a hospital. Of these 60, about 3 or 4 died every day; 
those who were not killed in the war and seemed strong were killed there in the 
hospital “intentionally”. An eye witness account mentions it as “እኔም… በበሇጠ 
ሐኪሞቹን ፊራሁዋቸዉ፣ ያሇማቋረጥም እንድጠረጥራቸዉ እዉነት ነበረኝ፡፡ ስሇምን; ጣሉያን 
የኢትዮጵያን ሕዝብ ቁጥር ሇመቀነስና ወጣቶችዋ ሲፈጸሙ ሰተት ብል ገብቶ ሇመያዝ፡፡”; “I feared the 
doctors more; I suspected them since I have my own truth. Why? Italy aspired to 
diminish the number of Ethiopian youngsters and when they finished [perished] it 
will enter [to the country] without problem.” (Tesfa Mikael, 2006 EC: 29). Besides 
this, theft and plunder in different urban centers in Italy, like in Naples and Rome 
were also the other challenges that hindered their safe arrival at home. (ibid: 28).  
Safe arrival to home area was not the end of the problem for many of the 
returnees. They were also expected to pay taxes from what they earned in Libya 
after entering the territory of their respective homelands (ibid: 22). Moreover, the 
money they brought could not be spent for escaping the chronic poverty mentioned 
above in most cases; rather it was spent for daily food. And that was why the 
people were said to sing as: 
 
“The son has gone to Libya to seek fortune 
His father spent it all on food 
Our tongues are alive indeed 
 
EJOSSAH Vol. XIII, No.2                                                      December 2017 
49 
 
It is our sense of pride that is dead” (Amanuel, 1998: 259). 
 
Contrary to all the negative consequences, the wars also resulted in some 
positive outcomes. The askaris were in the same battles and could understand the 
overall status and fighting skill of the white soldiers. This exposure developed their 
confidence and removed the inferiority feeling. Furthermore, it improved their 
consciousness; the Ethiopians and Eritreans were freed from the perception that the 
Italians are peoples with special knowledge and skill (Tesfa Mikael, 2006 EC: 31; 
Tesfaye Gebre‟ab, 2017: 176). The askaris also observed that the Italians feared 
the Libyan soldiers extremely. As a result, they began to assume Italians as 
“cowards” (ibid: 21). As indicated in the following excerpt, the askaris also came 
across the prevalence of the “backwardness” and the “rudeness” of some members 
of the Italian society in and around Napoli.  
 
“የናፖሉም ሇማኝና ላባ ሰርቆ ቢታሰር ከዉርዯት አይቆጥረዉም::”(ibid: 27)  
 
which nearly means, 
 
“The thieves and beggars of Napoli were not ashamed of their crime when they 
were jailed because of that.”  
 
Particularly, the prevalence of theft, prostitutions, and poverty as well as begging 
in the area developed a sort of confidence in the minds of the askaris, since the 
Italians were not as they boasted here in Africa or Ethiopia.  
 
Conclusion  
European Colonial powers mobilized African askaris against the Africans 
themselves during their invasion of the continent in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries. Similarly, Italy employed Ethiopians and Eritrean askaris for their 
colonial wars in Libya.  It would have not succeeded in its occupation of Libya in 
the absence of the askaris. This was because of several reasons. Economically, 
Italy could employ the askaris with less cost that spared their modest economy.  
Ecologically, the Ethiopians and Eritreans were ideal for the topography and desert 
climate of Libya which was too harsh for the Italians to overcome. Politically, the 
war and death of Italian soldiers would have resulted in opposition against the 
colonial policy at home in Italy. The employment of Ethiopians and Eritreans as a 
substitute could avert the possible political crisis in Italy since no one worried 





Ethiopians and Eritreans were courageous enough and committed in contrast to the 
Italians to fight in the wars. In fact, they were eager to fight in the desert not in 
vain. Rather, a number of factors forced them to leave their home knowing that 
they would die in a foreign desert fighting the others‟ wars. Poverty, hunger and 
famines, and love for firearms can be mentioned as the major factors among 
others. Consequently, their campaign for foreign wars resulted in several social 
crisis in their home area. More than anything else, the wars led Libyans to develop 
chronic hatred for Ethiopians and Eritreans. Of course, it was one of the successful 
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